Rory stewart can intervention work

By subscribing, you acknowledge that your information will be transferred to MailChimp for processing. Learn more about MailChimp's privacy practices here. And also of a book called Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, by Frank Ledwidge, which describes how lack of local knowledge, overoptimism, and prioritising avoiding British casualties lost the popular support needed for success in Helmand, Basra, and elsewhere.

The dynamics sound very similar. Having read his books and travelled in Afghanistan would love to have heard his talk. He is an MP in Cumbria where i came from and apparently is very good. But he knows too much…. Nothing groundbreaking there. But I also worry that, if peace building is an exercise in inclusivity and collective problem solving, by restricting interventions to the very local level leaves a free hand for exclusive macro political maneuverings higher up.

But having just read the David Booth article about the importance of asking uncomfortable questions is this charm a thin veneer of lipstick on a deep-establishment pig? The son of the deputy director of MI6 and a Baroness with a family seat on the Scottish border, Eton educated, almost certainly MI6 himself, former military and a private tutor to the future King: a beacon of social transformation and inclusivity he is not, I suspect.

Would it not be a little saddening if his establishment tune was the one our field danced to? He is obviously very bright and well educated, and now he is a government minister he is definitively establishment to a certain extent. But rather than judging him on his luck in having wealthy ancestors and his parents decision to send him to the UK for private education, I judge him on his words. As this blog and his book on his time in Iraq show, he is not in favour of colonial style interventions.

Oct 12, Euan Carey rated it really liked it. Excellent book that fights back against the narrative that there is a catch all solution for nation building. Apr 20, Antenna rated it really liked it. Focusing on Afghanistan since , Rory Stewart identifies reasons for the failure of intervention to achieve a "sustainable solution".

Goals have been unclear, obscured by buzzwords and western-style "management speak". Leaders sent in to sort out the problems have stayed for only short periods, with foreign specialists remaining ignorant of the local culture since they rarely set foot outside protected compounds for security reasons. So, each successive surge of ever larger numbers of troops, Focusing on Afghanistan since , Rory Stewart identifies reasons for the failure of intervention to achieve a "sustainable solution".

So, each successive surge of ever larger numbers of troops, with additional resources and revised policies, has failed to stabilise the situation. Little heed was taken of McNamara's "lessons" from Vietnam, notably that "there may be no immediate solutions. We failed to recognise the limitations of modern high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine We viewed people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experiences.

We do not have a God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose. We exaggerated the dangers to the United States".

In contrast to Stewart's somewhat rambling, anecdotal contribution which often seems overly concerned to display his literary style, Gerald Knaus produces a systematic, coherent and very informative analysis of the relatively successful restoration of peace in Bosnia from the late s, although recent events may have undermined this.

Triggered, some say too late, by shame over inaction in the face of genocide in Rwanda and Srebinica, intervention in Bosnia largely took the form of targeted bombing and training to support Croatian and Bosnian soldiers against the Serbs. Knaus examines four interpretations of intervention in the Balkans. He is critical of the "planning school of nation-building" as developed by the American Rand Corporation think tank which argues that the number of troops and resources needed to subdue a population of a certain size can be calculated "scientifically" using formulae.

It is a simple questions of inputs versus outputs. The fact that Vietnam at one point had more than , troops covering a population of 19 million suggests the inadequacy of this approach, which is also likely to be prohibitively expensive anyway for a large country.

At the other extreme is the "sceptical futility" school which Knaus finds too negative: "if you understand the culture, if you avoid counterproductive violence Knaus concedes that a period of tough, authoritarian "liberal imperialism" may be necessary as practised by Paddy Ashdown when High Representative in Bosnia, but he clearly favours what he calls "principled incrementalism", a kind of "muddling through with a sense of purpose" in, for instance, the process of enabling displaced groups to return with a degree of grassroots organisation.

Although very interesting and chastening reading, this book might have been more effective if ideas could have been integrated into a continuous whole, rather than presented in two separate sections by different authors with some repetition.

Coverage of a wider range of war zones would also have been useful to demonstrate key points. Half autobiography, half policy critique, this essay by Rory Stewart has a few interesting anecdotes but isn't really worth buying. His arguments are mostly sound, but the framing -- 'How Rory Failed to Prevent the Surge' -- can be a little trying.

Aug 30, Shafiqah Nor rated it really liked it. This book was published in , and I can't help but observe how advance Stewart's thinking was on his essay on Afghanistan in what he had predicted would be a 'failed intervention'.

He compares it to Vietnam as another intervention based on "exaggerated danger to the Uniter States" and criticized foreign bureaucracy and revolving diplomatic core of countries for the lack of local expertise.

Additionally, the buzzwords and jargon of "rule of law" and "sustainability" often seen in international development are complicit for such failures - there is also little will to understand local norms, especially when security becomes 'paramount'. Stewart also challenges the credibility of the Rand formula which is used as a "scientific method" of quantifying then number of troops to deploy. I also enjoyed Knaus' piece, he challenges the idea of Bosnia being the 'successful intervention' too frequently cited as a model case.

He explores the concept of moral obligation to intervene by the international community, and the fine balance of threading towards occupation. The book brought back memories of my MA essays on state-building and consolidation of democracy.

Aug 10, Alex B rated it it was amazing. A thought-provoking book that addresses the issue of intervention in two parts. Rory Stewart convincingly puts forward the case that policy planners working in different countries need to have a proper understanding of the local customs, history and language, drawing on his own experiences in Afghanistan, where diplomats worked in air-conditioned offices with little command of the language or chances to speak to ordinary Afghan people.

The second section, written by Gerald Knaus, analyses the di A thought-provoking book that addresses the issue of intervention in two parts. The second section, written by Gerald Knaus, analyses the different interpretations of interventions, cutting through the myths, benefits and shortcomings of different approaches.

These include: the belief that interventions can be calculated and planned to a sharp degree beforehand, and that success in an intervention is contingent with amount of money thrown at the situation, or the Cato institute view that holds that interventions are generally futile endeavours.

Knaus applies the Bosnian case to his analysis, showing an example of how interventions, and their aftermath, can be successful, even in the face of so much doubt.

Nov 10, Mick rated it liked it. I enjoyed Stewart's other books more. Worth a read for those interested in International Relations. May 12, Alana rated it liked it. Loved the Rory Stewart essay -- the Gerald Knaus essay was irritating to finish. May 01, Matt A rated it it was ok. Intervention only seems to work out between loving parties a parent preventing a kid from touching an oven, a friend physically restraining a friend from suicide.

This book asks a supremely easy question one most children know the answer to. It then tries to give a really complicated "yes", all the while desperatel Intervention only seems to work out between loving parties a parent preventing a kid from touching an oven, a friend physically restraining a friend from suicide.

It then tries to give a really complicated "yes", all the while desperately avoiding the obvious and simple "no". Feb 18, Anne Maesaka rated it liked it. I am a huge fan of Rory Stewart. He knows more about the conflict in Afghanistan than all the government officials and diplomats put together.

In this book he details why most conflict interventions fail, specifically the ones in the Middle East. I only wish our government officials would read this book and follow some of his recommendations. Every conflict has to be dealt with differently and not the cookie cutter UN mediated scripts. That being said I found the section by Gerald Knaus redundant and not particularly interesting.

I felt that it repeated much of what Rory Stewart had already covered and did not really enhance the reading experience. Could have easily been left out of the book. Dec 31, Gemma rated it really liked it. This book is affected me because I've lived and worked in one of the places discussed.

It left me at times sad and ashamed and then hopeful and fired up. And finally lost and confused because - like most books of this nature - the conclusion was weak. There is no clear answer or solution to the question "can intervention work".

Both authors are critical of fo This book is affected me because I've lived and worked in one of the places discussed. Both authors are critical of foreign interveners mostly because we do not take the time to get to know the societies we are "helping" - we don't learn the language or get to know the local cultures which leads to the application of theories and tactics which fail. I can't disagree. I recognised too much in this book and saw the problems first hand.

After 10 years of war in Afghanistan, international efforts have clearly been undermined by an extreme detachment from the lives of ordinary Afghans. It made for depressing reading. The authors conclude - I believe - in making a strong case for intervention on moral grounds.

More "developed" nations can not stand by for too long and see human rights being abused without being obligated to step in. Which I still whole-heartedly agree with. But it also makes a strong case for lowering our ambition and expectations about whether or not we really can or should change a society.

Not unless we are willing to invest heavily in manpower and resources and spend time getting to know the local culture. There is no magic bullet. The book left me sad. I wish I hadn't played my minor part in the mistakes made. Having said that I still believe that intervention is justified at times.

I read this on a train coming back from Washington DC, which was rather poignant given the power base it is. It's exactly in the capitols where grand theories of intervention are planned - far from the realities on the ground.

Feb 16, Sam rated it it was amazing. I respect Rory Stewart a lot, and his descriptions and insights are "overwhelming" and sadly far too commonly observed. And then we are surprised that it does not work, or has failed,not counting the misery and destruction involved. Man Oh Man!! A very impressive, and while it is blunt and shows how wrong the west in Af Whew!

A very impressive, and while it is blunt and shows how wrong the west in Afghanistan has been, it does not rule out intervention We must - stop using buzz words that are so remotly relevant to the - local culture, history, societies structuer etc. Some buzz words mentionned I liked: "effective and accountable state", good governance, gender sensitive, How would that translate to a distant village, occupied by foreign armed forces.

Feb 13, Joe Chernicoff rated it it was amazing. Continuing education is a task all hopefully intelligent American undertake. That does not mean you have to attend seminars or workshops, or enroll in classes at institutions of higher learning.

Books written by knowledgeable authors can be, and are, the path to higher learning. Regardless of your own knowledge, political leanings, and other relevant factors which have a tendency to lock your mind onto a given track of thought, as a wise person you understand that oftimes the real case is that Continuing education is a task all hopefully intelligent American undertake.

Regardless of your own knowledge, political leanings, and other relevant factors which have a tendency to lock your mind onto a given track of thought, as a wise person you understand that oftimes the real case is that you can always learn something which can help fine tune your thinking, and fine tune your understanding of what governments and their representatives do. Rory Stewart, a best selling author, and a member of Parliament, writes about intervention in Afghanistan; Gerald Knauss the founding member of the European Stability Initiative, provides a highly informative insight to the Balkan intervention.

Fascinating reading from both authors. You may have understood how intervention can work without realizing it, but then the question arises, does it, in all cases?

They were wrong in Radovan Karadzic did not in the end emerge triumphant, and Bosniaks and Croats did not restart fighting. They were overly pessimistic in large-scale return of minorities did take place. No intervention achieves all of its objectives; perhaps most interventions fail to achieve most; and some might fail across the board. It is the distinction between these cases, and between policies that make one outcome more likely than the other, that is the most important question facing policy-makers.

To this the futility school offers no answers. And that even when all the leaders have recognized that a policy is not working, how impossible it often seems for them to organize withdrawal.

The actual writing took place during my time with the Harvard Kennedy School, first as a visiting and then as an associate fellow at the Carr Center on Human Rights Policy. I am grateful to the school, the center, colleagues, other fellows and all of our impressive students. It was a privilege to work alongside all of them. Special thanks to Charlie Clements, and of course to Rory, for persuading me to come to the US, agreeing to take up the challenge of a joint book and then finding time to work long nights — in Istanbul, Scotland, Cumbria and London — despite the demands of a political career.

I am also grateful for the enormous patience and encouragement of everyone at Norton, Jake Schindel, Brendan Curry and Roby Harrington. Can intervention work?